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I. INTRODUCTION
OR the twenty-two million Americans employed by federal, state,
and local governments,' free speech on the job ended in 2006. The
Supreme Court's watershed ruling in Garcetti v. Ceballos created a
categorical rule that removes First Amendment protections when public
employees speak pursuant to their "official duties."'2 From university
professors to police officers to everyday civil servants, the choice became
as simple as "[w]atch your mouth or relinquish your job."' 3 The ruling
was widely reviled as a step backward in the Court's free speech jurispru-
dence.4 Even the Court acknowledged that Garcetti created uncertain
and sweeping effects on academic freedom, political expression, and em-
ployer retaliation that were "not fully accounted for."' 5 Yet rather than
join the extensive scholarship on Garcetti's effects, this Comment offers a
consistent rule for applying it. Worse than Garcetti's harsh consequences
is the uncertainty caused by rules that arbitrarily define the boundaries of
free speech. That much is clear from the courts below. At bottom, con-
sistency and clarity are key to protecting employee free speech.
"Navigatirlg the shoals" of Garcetti has proven to be "tricky business"
because of its factual and contextual inquiry.6 Consider the following
facts: A government inspector refuses to sign an affidavit prepared by his
employer, which describes a coworker's poor job performance. 7 Believ-
ing his coworker is the victim of racial discrimination, the inspector writes
an affidavit praising his colleague. 8  The employer retaliates by
fabricating low performance reviews and firing the inspector.9 Or what if
a police officer reports his coworker for police brutality? 10 He too suffers
dwindling performance reviews and is fired for refusing to change his
story.1 1 In both cases, the employees seek First Amendment protection
and the employers invoke the Garcetti rule. Both scenarios raise the
same question: Can a government employer discipline an employee for
preparing a report and refusing to retract it? The District of Columbia
Circuit answered yes, and the Second Circuit answered no.
1. Summary of Public Employment and Payrolls by Type of Government. March
2007, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/apes/emp-compen-
dium.pdf.
2. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
3. Christie S. Totten, Quieting Disruption: The Mistake of Curtailing Public Employ-
ees' Free Speech Under Garcetti v. Ceballos, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 234 (2008).
4. See Julie A. Wenell, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Stifling the First Amendment in the Public
Workplace, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 623, 623 (2007) (arguing that "more than 19.4
million public employees nationwide lost a battle in the war being waged against free
speech").
5. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
6. Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2011).
7. See Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1126, reh'g denied, 653 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
8. Id. at 1127.
9. Id.
10. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 231 (2d Cir. 2011).
11. Id. at 231-32.
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In Bowie v. Maddox and Jackler v. Byrne, two circuits applied Garcetti
to nearly identical facts but reached opposite conclusions. In Bowie, the
D.C. Circuit followed the Garcetti rule to conclude that the employee had
no First Amendment recourse. 12 Faced with similar circumstances in
Jackler, the Second Circuit made an end-run around Garcetti by creating
its own "civilian analog" test.1 3 As the D.C. Circuit put it, the civilian
analog test makes Garcetti "as useful as a mosquito net made of chicken
wire."'14 The D.C. court used Bowie's petition for rehearing to lambast
the "dubious interpretation" of its sister circuit as pandering to sympa-
thetic circumstances.' 5 The circuits' marked divergence further muddles
the issue of "official duties" under Garcetti. These First Amendment
rights are relevant to all members of society as government employees
become increasingly politically active.16 The standard governing police
reports, affidavits, government documents, and any other form of govern-
ment expression where truth and candor are important requires greater
certainty.
This Comment clarifies the scope of official duties under Garcetti when
a government whistleblower suffers employer retaliation for filing a re-
port and refusing to retract it. Section I is a historical overview of First
Amendment rights for government employees. Section II describes the
confusion under current law resulting from the D.C. and Second Circuit
split. Section III answers two central questions raised in the
whistleblower context. First, how should courts determine whether an
employee's report or complaint was made pursuant to his official duties?
Asking what an employee was "paid to perform" is a more effective
framework than the Second Circuit's unworkable civilian analog test.
Second, precisely which duties arise in the circumstance of government
whistleblowers? Particularly as plaintiffs have argued to escape Garcetti,
do government employees have an official duty "to tell the truth" and a
distinct civilian duty "to refuse to lie"? To the contrary, government em-
ployees have only an official duty to tell the truth. Courts must choose
between faithfully applying the categorical Garcetti rule and crafting per-
missive loopholes. Regardless of Garcetti's policy pitfalls, this Comment
provides a framework for consistently applying the Court's holding. Clar-
ity is paramount for the nation's twenty-two million government workers,
who must know where their First Amendment rights begin and where
they end.
12. Bowie, 642 F.3d at 1136-37.
13. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 237-38.
14. Bowie, 653 F.3d at 48.
15. Id.
16. Monica Davey & Steven Greenhouse, Angry Demonstrations in Wisconsin as Cuts
Loom, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2 0 11/O2/17/us/17wisconsin.
html (quoting Professor William Gould of Stanford Law School who argues that "gover-




II. HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH FOR
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Public employees have long been the unwanted black sheep of the First
Amendment family. In 1892, Massachusetts policeman John McAuliffe
was fired for engaging in political activity. 17 Oliver Wendell Holmes,
then sitting on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, wrote the opinion dis-
missing McAuliffe's case.18 In the otherwise inconsequential case,
Holmes coined the phrase that defined government employees' rights for
decades: "[T]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."'19 Holmes contin-
ued, "On the same principle the city may impose any reasonable condi-
tion upon holding offices within its control."'20 For most of the twentieth
century, "the unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no
right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment-in-
cluding those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights. '21
Those Americans employed by their own government worked in a consti-
tutional vacuum devoid of First Amendment rights.22
A. THE PRE-GARCETTi FREE SPEECH SURGE
Despite its inauspicious beginnings, free speech cases surged in the
1950s in response to the draconian efforts of government employers to
stifle speech and political expression. The Court began aggressively po-
licing employment agreements that forced workers to swear loyalty oaths
and to reveal their political affiliations. 23 The unfettered employer dis-
cretion of Holmes's epigram caused a widespread chilling effect "by the
fear of discharge from joining political parties and other associations that
certain public officials might find 'subversive."' 24 The Court's modern
jurisprudence began with the case of Marvin Pickering, an Illinois teacher
who wrote his local newspaper to criticize the school board's finances. 25
In response, the board dismissed Pickering under a state statute forbid-
ding actions "detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of
the schools of the district."' 26 In Pickering v. Board of Education, the
Court first solidified its jurisprudence affirming the First Amendment
17. McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892).
18. See id.
19. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1983) (citing McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at
517) ("For many years, Holmes's epigram expressed [the Supreme Court's] law.").
20. McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 518.
21. Connick, 461 U.S. at 143.
22. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) ("[T]he government as em-
ployer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign.").
23. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (invalidating state effort to with-
hold government salaries until employees swore oath that they were not communists); see
also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 610 (1967) (invalidating regulations that
allowed university to terminate "seditious" employees).
24. Connick, 461 U.S. at 144-45.
25. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564-66 (1968).
26. Id. at 564-65.
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rights of employees outside the workplace. The Justices "unequivocally
rejected" the premise that teachers "may constitutionally be compelled to
relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citi-
zens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the op-
eration of the public schools in which they work."'2 7
Pickering sought to strike the appropriate balance between employee
free speech and the employer's legitimate interest in orderly operations.
The government employer cannot stifle employee speech entirely. Nor,
of course, can the employee be allowed to say whatever he likes with
impunity. The Court sought to "arrive at a balance between the interests
of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees. '28 While es-
chewing a strict standard, Pickering created a balancing test between the
two interests. 29 So long as a teacher spoke "on issues of public impor-
tance" and without knowing or reckless disregard for the statement's fal-
sity, he was entitled to First Amendment balancing against his employer's
retaliation.30 Because school finances were a matter of public concern, to
which "free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the
electorate," Pickering's termination was unlawful. 31
The Court clarified the Pickering balancing test in 1983 in Connick v.
Myers, which made speaking on an issue of "public concern" a threshold
requirement for Pickering balancing. 32 Read together, the cases created
a two-part test for government-employee speech. First, did the employee
speak on a matter of public concern? If not, he is not entitled to First
Amendment protections.33 Second, if the employee did speak on a mat-
ter of public concern, the court proceeds to Pickering balancing.34 The
Court offered broad parameters for distinguishing public from private
concerns by examining the statement's "content, form, and context" ap-
parent in "the whole record. '35 For instance, the plaintiff in Connick was
an assistant district attorney who was fired after distributing a question-
naire to her coworkers questioning their superiors. 36 The Court found
that this was largely a matter of private concern because it pertained to
her own transfer and other internal department grievances, not issues of
broader public significance. 37 As the Court explained, "[WIhile discipline
and morale in the workplace are related to an agency's efficient perform-
ance of its duties, the focus of Myers' questions is not to evaluate the
27. Id. at 568.
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 574-75.
31. Id. at 571-72.
32. See 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 147-48.




performance of the office but rather to gather ammunition for another
round of controversy with her superiors. '38 Accordingly, the Court re-
fused to "constitutionalize the employee grievance. '39
The Pickering and Connick two-step inquiry formed the basis of the
Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence, but left one question unan-
swered: Could a government employee speak "as a citizen on matters of
public concern" while on the job? 40 This question divided the circuits
and even caused intra-circuit splits between decisions in the same cir-
cuit.41 The subjective uncertainty of distinguishing matters of public and
private concern, specifically regarding employee speech pursuant to their
official duties, was only resolved with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Garcetti.
B. GARCETTI AND "OFFICIAL DUTIES"
Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney in Los Angeles, where
he worked as a "calendar deputy" supervising several prosecutors. 42 In
2000, a defense attorney asked Ceballos to review a search warrant affi-
davit that he believed was inaccurate. 43 Ceballos discovered inconsisten-
cies in the affidavit and was unable to discern a satisfactory explanation
from the deputy who signed it.44 Concerned that the prosecution was
predicated on misrepresentations by the deputies who secured the war-
rant, Ceballos began alerting his superiors. 45 He first prepared a disposi-
tion memo that explained his findings and recommended dismissal. 46 The
memo caused a "heated" meeting between the prosecutors, defense at-
torneys, and sheriff's deputies, who were harshly critical of Ceballos's at-
tempts to dismiss the case.47 Finally, Ceballos testified for the defense at
a hearing to quash the warrant.48 For his efforts to derail the prosecution,
Ceballos claimed his superiors retaliated by demoting him to trial deputy,
transferring him to another courthouse, and refusing to promote him. 49
His superiors countered that Ceballos's actions were misguided, inflam-
38. Id.
39. Id. at 154.
40. See Sonya Bice, Tough Talk from the Supreme Court on Free Speech: The Illusory
Per Se Rule in Garcetti As Further Evidence of Connick's Unworkable Employee/Citizen
Speech Partition, 8 J.L. Soc'y 45, 45-46 (2007).
41. Id. at 55-57.
42. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
43. Id. at 413-14; see also Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004),
rev'd and remanded, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006) (indicating that "the deputy sheriff had, at
the least, grossly misrepresented the facts").
44. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413-14.
45. Id. at 414.
46, Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 414-15 (explaining the defense attorney filed a "motion to traverse," the
California procedural mechanism for challenging the sufficiency of a warrant).
49. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415; see also Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1171-72 (9th
Cir. 2004) (noting that Ceballos claimed superiors were "rude and hostile," "threatened"
him for testifying truthfully for the defense, claimed they would demote him to prosecuting
misdemeanor crimes, and barred him from trying murder cases).
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matory, and insubordinate. 50 After Ceballos's employment grievance
was denied, he filed a Section 1983 claim, alleging that his First and Four-
teenth Amendment free speech rights had been violated.51
The district court dismissed Ceballos's case on summary judgment,
finding that the district attorney's office was entitled to qualified immu-
nity because they had not violated his First Amendment rights.52 Apply-
ing the threshold Connick question, the court reasoned that Ceballos did
not speak on a matter of public concern because writing disposition
memos was "pursuant to his duties as a prosecutor" and therefore not
entitled to First Amendment protections.5 3 The Ninth Circuit reversed,
finding that Ceballos had spoken on a matter of public concern.54 The
court distinguished Connick, where the prosecutor aired purely personal
grievances, from Ceballos who alleged "law enforcement perjury. '55 The
court noted that the Connick court classified one of the plaintiff's ques-
tions as a matter of public concern, despite the personal nature of her
grievances, because it involved whether employees felt pressured to par-
ticipate in political activities.56 Similarly, police corruption was similarly
important to the public.57 The court of appeals characterized Ceballos as
a whistleblower because he exposed internal corruption.58 Since he ad-
dressed a matter of public concern, Ceballos was entitled to Pickering
balancing, under which the court found that the public's interest out-
weighed the district attorney's administrative concerns. 59 As such, the
court of appeals reversed and remanded.60
Notably, the majority discussed and vigorously opposed the categorical
rule that the Supreme Court eventually developed. 61 Citing the Second,
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the court
claimed near unanimity in rejecting a per se rule against First Amend-
ment protections within the scope of an employee's duties.62 Especially
in regard to whistleblowers, "Stripping [government employees] of that
right when they report wrongdoing or other significant matters to their
50. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.
51. Id. at 410.
52. Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV0011106AHMAJWX, 2002 WL 34098285, at *6-7
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002) (also finding that the government had not violated a "clearly
established" right, a required element to overcome qualified immunity, because authorities
were so conflicted over the application of Pickering and Connick).
53. Id. at *5-6 (noting that even though police misconduct might appear to be a matter
of public concern "[a]t first blush," the fact that he wrote as an employee as part of his job
trumps the "mere significance of that issue").
54. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1184-85.




59. Id. at 1178-81. Curiously, the court of appeals questioned the veracity of Cebal-
los's allegations. Id. After all, the trial judge in the underlying criminal case overruled the
defendant's motion to quash, despite Ceballos's testimony. See id.
60. Id. at 1185.




supervisors would seriously undermine our ability to maintain the integ-
rity of our governmental operations. ' 63 Refusing to distinguish internal
whistleblowing (reporting corruption to superiors) from external
whistleblowing (reporting corruption to outside authorities or the media),
the court reasoned that "depriv[ing] public employees of constitutional
protection when they fulfill this employment obligation, while affording
them protection if they bypass their supervisors and take their tales, for
profit or otherwise, directly to a scandal sheet or to an internet political
smut purveyor defies sound reason."'64 Flying in the face of the Ninth
Circuit's self-professed "sound reason," the Supreme Court crafted pre-
cisely such a rule.65
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, creat-
ing a categorical rule that eviscerated all First Amendment protections
for speech made within the scope of a government employee's official
duties. 66 As Justice Kennedy wrote for the divided court, "when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employ-
ees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer disci-
pline. '67 The Court recognized the uneasy tension between a govern-
ment employer's interest in discipline and efficiency and the fact that "a
citizen who works for the government is nonetheless still a citizen."' 68
Garcetti signaled a wholesale waiver of employment-related free speech
rights because "[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public em-
ployee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the
employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen."'69 In short, Garcetti
creates an additional hurdle to overcome before a government employee
is entitled to Pickering balancing.70 First, if an employee speaks pursuant
to his official duties, the inquiry ends and no First Amendment protec-
tions exist. 71 Second, if the employee does not speak pursuant to his offi-
cial duties, the Court asks the Connick threshold question of whether the
employee speaks on a matter of public importance. 72 If yes, the Court
proceeds to Pickering balancing. 73
The Garcetti Court's categorical rule shifted the ambiguity from "When
does an employee speak on a matter of public significance on the job?" to
"When does an employee speak pursuant to his official duties?" Garcetti
defined the contours of official duties in only the broadest strokes. The
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1176.
65. Garcitti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 419.
69. Id. at 421-22.
70. See Williams v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 2007) ("The
Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Garcetti v. Ceballos added a threshold layer to
the Pickering balancing test.").
71. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
72. Id. at 423.
73. Id.
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fact that Ceballos spoke inside the office, rather than publicly, was not
dispositive.7 4 Nor was it dispositive that his expression related to his
job.7 5 Rather, the "controlling factor" was that Ceballos spoke "pursuant
to his official duties," or as "part of what he was employed to do."' 76 Es-
sentially, when an employee performs a purely work-related function, he
is an employee for all First Amendment purposes, not a citizen. 77 Regu-
lating this type of expression, which "owes its existence to a public em-
ployee's professional responsibilities .. .simply reflects the exercise of
employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or cre-
ated."'7 8 This distinction makes all expression that falls under the um-
brella of an employee's official duties fair game for wholesale employer
regulation.79
The Court directly countered the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, which
"[m]isconceive[d] the theoretical underpinnings of this Court's decisions
and [was] unfounded as a practical matter."' 80 Construing Garcetti as a
model of judicial restraint, the Court warned that the Ninth Circuit's rule
would "commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intru-
sive role, mandating judicial oversight of communications between and
among government employees and their superiors in the course of official
business." 81 By effectively ceding the field of speech regulation to em-
ployers, Garcetti was undeniably less invasive. The Court found that the
Ninth Circuit's concerns about protections for whistleblowers were also
unfounded. 82 If employers were "troubled by the perceived anomaly"
between protected and unprotected employee speech, they could recon-
cile it by providing an internal avenue for grievances. 8 3 There was, of
course, no clear recourse if an employee felt equally troubled by the
anomaly of discouraging internal complaints while encouraging external
grievances. The Ninth Circuit was not alone in its concerns about leaving
government whistleblowers unprotected.8 4 Just as the court of appeals
noted the anomaly of punishing internal grievances but protecting an em-
ployee who tattles, Justice Stevens's dissent recognized, "it seems per-
verse to fashion a new rule that provides employees with an incentive to






80. Id. at 412.
81. Id. at 411.
82. Id. at 412.
83. Id. at 424.
84. Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Ruben J. Garcia, Against Legislation:
Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Paradox of Statutory Protection for Public Employees, 7 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 22, 23 (2008) (suggesting Garcetti was not speaking directly to the issue of
whistleblowers); Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a
More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1636 (2008)
(surveying the many conflicting policy considerations concerning government whistle-
blowers-as even the Garcetti Court recognized, many of these issues remain unsettled).
2012]
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voice their concerns publicly before talking frankly to their superiors. '85
Nonetheless, as construed by the majority, free speech at work became
"the government giveth, and the government taketh away."
C. POST-GARCETTI CHAOS
Garcetti was quickly criticized by segments of the bar, the bench, and
associations of government workers.86 After enjoying thirty-eight years
of enhanced free-speech protections, public workers returned to the dark
days before Pickering. But for every question with a disappointing an-
swer, there were far more unanswered questions. Despite the Court's
categorical rule, Garcetti's fledgling legacy is one of ambiguity and uncer-
tainty.87 Given the breadth of workers employed by the government,
scholars speculated about its consequences in a range of fields, noting
that "[a]lthough Garcetti aimed to provide clarity and limit judicial inter-
ference in government operations, the rule that the Court established is
troubling because it deviates from precedent in ways that may thwart the
interests of the individual speaker, the public, and the state employer. '88
Scholars sounding the loudest alarms suggested Garcetti marks a doctri-
nal shift, recognizing "government's expansive claims to control public
employees' expression mark a disturbing trend that imperils not only the
free speech rights of more than twenty million government workers, but
also the public's interest in transparent government. ' 89 As long as the
lower courts continue struggling to interpret Garcetti, its consequences
remain largely speculative. Beyond the categorical rule of official duties,
the shoals of Garcetti remain largely uncharted waters.
III. PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Garcetti quagmire created all the combustible elements of a rau-
cous circuit split over an array of First Amendment issues. But despite
the many unanswered questions and applications related to Garcetti, the
present circuit split centers on facts that are remarkably similar to those
that the Court addressed. First, the D.C. Circuit denied First Amend-
ment protection to a federal inspector for submitting an affidavit and re-
85. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. See, e.g., Theresa R. Gabriel, The Garcetti Decision: Its Impact on Free Speech,
WiS. PROF'L POLICE Ass'N (Feb. 10, 2012, 8:30 PM), http://wppa.com/news/10_07/Garcetti
Decision.htm ("The U.S. Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos eroded the
constitutional free speech rights of public employees."); see also, MLA Comm. on Aca-
demic Freedom & Prof'l Rights & Responsibilities, Ramifications of the Supreme Court's
Ruling in Garcetti v. Ceballos, MODERN LANGUAGE Ass'N (Feb. 12, 2012, 9:30 PM), http://
www.mla.org/garcetti-ceballos ("This development is bad enough, since it affects every
faculty member's ability to render an honest assessment of a wide variety of ordinary aca-
demic matters .... ").
87. See Tyler Wiese, Seeing Through the Smoke: "Official Duties" in the Wake of
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMp. L. 509, 509 (2010) ("The Court, however,
left it to lower courts to paint in the details of what 'official duties' actually means.").
88. Public Employee Speech, 120 HARV. L. REV. 273, 277 (2006).
89. Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's Control of Its
Workers' Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (2009).
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fusing to amend it, despite pressure from his superiors. 90 The next
month, the Second Circuit found that the First Amendment protected a
police officer who accused his coworker of police brutality and claimed
the department retaliated against him for his honesty.91 On rehearing,
the D.C. Circuit discussed the Second Circuit's reasoning at length, criti-
cizing the court's "backwards" logic and "dubious interpretation" as
wholly unfaithful to Garcetti.92 As the government's attorneys in Jackler
put it, "[T]he D.C. Circuit did not use tweezers; it used a
sledgehammer. '93
A. THE DC. CIRCUIT's READING OF GARCETTI
IN BoWIE v. MADDOX
In June 2011, the D.C. Circuit considered the case of David Bowie, a
former inspector in the District of Columbia's Office of the Inspector
General (OIG).94 The controversy began decades earlier, when Bowie
served in the FBI with Emanuel Johnson.95 Both were plaintiffs in a class
action suit against the Bureau that alleged discrimination against black
agents. 96 Johnson also filed numerous discrimination complaints against
the FBI and Assistant Director Jimmy C. Carter before transferring to
the OIG with Bowie.97 Bowie claimed that in 1999, Carter gave the OIG
an ultimatum to fire Johnson or the FBI would refuse to cooperate in any
further investigations. 98 Johnson was fired and filed a discrimination
complaint against the OIG with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and a Title XII claim in federal court. 99 The OIG
claimed Johnson was fired because of poor job performance, not discrimi-
nation.100 The government's attorney asked Bowie to sign an affidavit
detailing Johnson's shortcomings on the job.1'0 Bowie refused because of
"'misstatements of fact' and 'language that would convey impressions
that [he] would not agree with,"' and instead submitted his own affidavit
criticizing his superiors' handling of the case.' 0 2 Bowie eventually testi-
90. Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1126-27, 1136-37, reh'g denied, 653 F.3d 45
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
91. Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 229-32, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2011).
92. Bowie, 653 F.3d at 48.
93. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Jackler, 658 F.3d 225 (No. 11-517).
94. Bowie, 642 F.3d at 1122; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., D.C., http://oig.
dc.gov. The OIG is an independent agency within the D.C. government, created by Con-
gress to audit and investigate government operations to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
See id. The OIG refers all criminal violations to the Department of Justice and receives
funding directly from Congress. Id.




99. Id. at 1126-27.
100. Id. at 1126.
101. Id. at 1126-27.
102. Id. at 1127 (alteration in original).
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fied for Johnson in his suit. 10 3
According to Bowie, loyalty to his coworker invited scorn and retalia-
tion from his superiors. 10 4 Bowie's performance reviews began slipping,
he was removed from a high-profile investigation, passed over for a pro-
motion, and was finally fired in 2002.105 Bowie filed suit alleging First
Amendment violations, retaliation, and conspiracy. 10 6 The trial court
struck his First Amendment claim under Pickering balancing, and a jury
found for the defendants on the remaining claims. 10 7
Between Bowie's trial and appeal, Garcetti drastically changed the
analysis for government employee free-speech cases. While the district
court offered a lengthy discussion of the Pickering factors, the court of
appeals summarily dismissed the claim in two brief paragraphs. l08 Re-
gardless of whether he spoke on a matter of public concern, Bowie "was
not speaking 'as a citizen,' when he refused to sign the [first affidavit] or
when he composed the [second affidavit]" because he "was acting 'pursu-
ant to [his] official duties' as an employee of 01G."'10 9 Specifically, the
court noted that Bowie prepared the affidavit at his employer's direction
and signed it using his official title. 110 As such, all the speech in question
was made pursuant to his "official responsibilities" and unprotected by
the First Amendment under Garcetti.111 The court's cursory opinion
would not be its last word on the subject. After its sister court of appeals
considered nearly identical facts and reached an opposite conclusion, the
D.C. Circuit would return to defend its logic.
B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT's READING OF GARCETTI
IN JACKLER V. BYRNE
One month later, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in Jackler v.
Byrne, vacating the trial court's dismissal of Jason Jackler's First Amend-
ment claims. 1 2 Jackler served as police officer in Middletown, New
York.113 On the night of January 5, 2006, Jackler helped Sergeant Greg-
ory Metakes arrest Zachary Jones. 114 While handcuffed, Jones called
Metakes a "dick," prompting Metakes to strike him in the face. 115 When
103. Id. at 1127; see also Johnson v. Maddox, 270 F. Supp. 2d 38, 44 (D.D.C. 2003)
(rendering a take-nothing verdict in Johnson's suit).
104. Bowie, 642 F.3d at 1127.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1127-28.
107. Bowie v. Gonzales, 433 F. Supp. 2d 24, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2006) (rendering summary
judgment on May 4, 2006, twenty-six days before Garcetti was decided).
108. Compare Gonzales, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 32-33, with Bowie, 642 F.3d at 1133-34.
109. Bowie, 642 F.3d at 1133-34 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original).
110. Id. at 1134.
111. Id.
112. 658 F.3d 225, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2011).
113. Id. at 229. Jackler was technically a "probationary police officer," meaning he had
not been hired permanently. Id. However, there is no indication that this affected the
analysis of his First Amendment claims. See id.
114. Id. at 230.
115. Id. at 231.
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Jones filed a civilian complaint, department regulations required Jackler
to also file a report. 116 His report corroborated Jones's allegations.117
According to Jackler, his superiors immediately began conspiring to con-
ceal the truth.11 8 The police chief and other officials repeatedly pressured
Jackler to file a new report without the accusations of brutality.'1 9 When
he refused, the chief gave Jackler poor performance reviews and recom-
mended his termination to the Board of Police Commissioners. 120 Jackler
was fired on January 21, 2006.121 Meanwhile, Metakes was promoted.122
In response, Jackler filed a Section 1983 claim against the police chief
and other officials, which the trial court "reluctantly" dismissed.' 23 The
trial judge found that because police regulations required Jackler to also
file the report, it was made pursuant to his official duties and therefore
unprotected by the First Amendment under Garcetti.124 The Second Cir-
cuit considered these facts with a markedly different approach to Garcetti
than the D.C. Circuit. First, the court engaged in a lengthy balancing of
the Pickering factors, weighing the public's interest in exposing police
misconduct against the department's interest in efficiency and disci-
pline. 125 Because Jackler's interest in refusing to make a false report was
a matter of public concern, "rather than an effort to further some private
interest of Jackler personally," he was entitled to First Amendment
protection.126
Only then did the court address Garcetti, by seizing on a single line of
dictum in Justice Kennedy's opinion. Namely, "When a public employee
speaks pursuant to employment responsibilities, however, there is no rel-
evant analog to speech by citizens who are not government employ-
ees." 127 As the Second Circuit explained, "As a rule of thumb, activities
required of the employee as part of his employment duties are not per-
formed 'as a citizen' if they are not 'the kind of activity engaged in by
citizens who do not work for the government.'" 28 From this, the court
gleaned a "civilian analog" test: If a government employee's speech has a
civilian equivalent, it is not "pursuant to his [official] duties" and is thus
beyond the scope of Garcetti.129
116. Id. at 230-31.




121. Id. at 232.
122. Id. at 231; see also Administration, POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF MIDDLETOWN,
www.middletownpolice.comlhtml/administration.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2012) (showing
that Metakes has since been promoted again to Bureau Commander of Services).
123. Jackler v. Byrne, 708 F. Supp. 2d 319, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated and re-
manded, 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011).
124. Id. at 325.
125. Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235-39 (2d Cir. 2011).
126. Id. at 240-41.
127. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
128. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 237 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423).
129. Id. at 237-38.
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The Second Circuit relied heavily on the application of this civilian ana-
log test the year before in Weintraub v. Board of Education.130 In that
case, the Second Circuit dismissed the First Amendment claims of a
teacher who filed an employee grievance with his union that criticized
school discipline.131 The grievance was pursuant to his official duties be-
cause it was "'part-and-parcel of his concerns' about his ability to 'prop-
erly execute his duties.'"132 The court held that, unlike writing a
newspaper or discussing politics, an employee grievance has no civilian
analog.1 33 As such, Garcetti precluded his claims.' 34 Read together,
Weintraub and Jackler create the Second Circuit's civilian analog frame-
work. If government-employee speech has a civilian equivalent, it is pro-
tected by the First Amendment and may proceed to Pickering balancing.
If the speech does not have a civilian equivalent, it receives no First
Amendment protection under Garcetti.
The Second Circuit applied its civilian analog test to the facts of Jason
Jackler's case. First, the court found that Jackler's First Amendment
claims grew out of his "refusal to accede to defendants' demands that he
falsely exculpate Metakes," not the report that police regulations re-
quired him to write.135 The civilian analog of this refusal was the right of
any citizen "to decide what to say and what not to say, and, accordingly,
the right to reject governmental efforts to require him to make state-
ments he believes are false. ' 136 Just as the suspect was entitled to file a
civilian complaint recounting the abuse he suffered, Jackler was entitled
to file an analogous report without being forced by his superiors to lie
about the incident.137 The court rejected the government's central argu-
ment that the duty to make a truthful report and the duty not to make a
false report are the same thing.138 Essentially, the government argued
that "heads" and "not tails" are the same side of the coin. 139 However,
notwithstanding the department regulations that required Jackler to pro-
duce the report in question, the court concluded that "it is clear that the
First Amendment protects the rights of a citizen to refuse to retract a
report to the police that he believes is true, to refuse to make a statement
that he believes is false, and to refuse to engage in unlawful conduct by
filing a false report with the police.' 140
Thus, on almost precisely the same facts as Bowie, the Second Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion and reversed the trial court's dismis-
130. See 593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2010).
131. Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 198-200.
132. Id. at 203 (citing Williams v. Dali. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir.
2007)).
133. Id. at 203-04.
134. Id. at 205.
135. Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225,241 (2d Cir. 2011); see Jackler v. Byrne, 708 F. Supp.
2d 319, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
136. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241.
137. Id. at 241-42.
138. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Jackler, 658 F.3d 241-42.
139. See id.
140. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241.
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sal. 141 The Jackler opinion was praised by those critical of Garcetti as "a
much-needed and welcome development for public employees and the
First Amendment. 1 1 42 The civilian analog reasoning seemed to open a
gaping loophole in the otherwise categorical rule. The first impressions
from commentators indicated that the Garcetti bar on government free
speech had been significantly lowered.1 43 But the Second Circuit would
not have the last word on the subject, nor would the commentary be lim-
ited to scholars and practitioners. The D.C. Circuit returned to bolster its
holding and to lambast its Second Circuit colleagues.
C. THE D.C. SLEDGEHAMMER: RECONSIDERING BOWIE AND JACKLER
In direct response to the Second Circuit's reasoning in Jackler, Bowie
petitioned the D.C. Circuit for rehearing. 144 He claimed the court was
wrong to bar his claim under Garcetti because his complaint had a civilian
analog.145 Any civilian could report discriminatory practices to the
EEOC, just as Bowie did. 146 In the alternative, he argued that even if the
civilian analog was not dispositive, his speech was nonetheless protected
because it was not made pursuant to his official duties.' 47 The court sum-
marily dismissed the second argument, having already found Bowie's
speech was made pursuant to his official duties as an OIG inspector.1 48
The court went to greater lengths to dismiss the first argument and dispel
any notion of a civilian analog test.149
The D.C. Circuit accused the Jackler court of asking the wrong ques-
tion entirely. Rather than asking whether Jackler spoke pursuant to his
official duties, the Second Circuit "elided the question whether Jackler
spoke as a citizen into its identification of a civilian analog for the rele-
vant speech.' 150 This gets the proper test "backwards" because "[t]he
critical question under Garcetti is not whether the speech at issue has a
civilian analogue, but whether it was performed 'pursuant to ... official
duties.' ,,151 Further, the D.C. panel argued that Jackler takes the "citizen
analog" language out of context.1 52 Just because Justice Kennedy ob-
served that speech made pursuant to official duties has no relevant citizen
141. Id. at 244-45.
142. David L. Hudson Jr., 2nd Circuit Ruling Offers Glimmer of Hope in Post-Garcetti
World, THE FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (July 28, 2011), http://www.firstamendment
center.org/2nd-circuit-ruling-offers-glimmer-of-hope-in-post-garcetti-word.
143. See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Second Circuit Finds Garcetti Does Not Bar First
Amendment Claim of Police Officer, CONST. LAW PROF. BLOG (July 25, 2011), http://law
professors.typepad.com/conlaw/2011/07/second-circuit-finds-garcetti-does-not-bar-first-
amendment-claim-of-police-officer.html.




148. Id. at 47.
149. Id. at 46-48.
150. Id. at 47.
151. Id. at 48.
152. Id. at 47-48.
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equivalent does not necessarily mean the opposite is true.153 Govern-
ment speech could well have some conceivable civilian equivalent, but
only "when public employees 'make public statements outside the course
of performing their official duties' do they 'retain some possibility of First
Amendment protection.'"154 Only in this circumstance is the civilian an-
alog analysis appropriate. 55
Even if a civilian analog test were appropriate, the D.C. Circuit argued
that the Jackler court misapplied it to the facts. 15 6 The Second Circuit
focused on the civilian freedom not to lie, underplaying that "a police
officer has a duty not to substitute a falsehood for the truth."'1 57 The
official duty to submit a truthful report cannot be recast as the civilian
freedom not to lie. Jason Jackler was punished for fulfilling his duty to
file an obligatory report, just as David Bowie was punished for fulfilling
his duty to submit an affidavit for the investigation.158 These direct or-
ders from their superiors were pursuant to their official duties, regardless
of a civilian analog. The D.C. Circuit argued that the Jackler loophole
threatened to subsume the Garcetti rule entirely because "[aill official
speech, viewed at a sufficient level of abstraction, has a civilian ana-
logue."' 59 The civilian analog provides a First Amendment cause of ac-
tion to any government employee who can argue a civilian comparison
even though the Supreme Court intended just the opposite.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit speculated that the Jackler court was
prompted to misapply the law because of its sympathy for Jackler, noting
that "[u]nder the circumstances, it is not difficult to sympathize with the
Second Circuit's dubious interpretation of Garcetti.' 60 The facts strongly
indicated Jackler was the victim of a department cover-up of police bru-
tality and that his superiors retaliated for his insistence on telling the
truth.16 ' Nonetheless, "the illegality of a government employer's order
does not necessarily mean the employee has a cause of action under the
First Amendment when he contravenes that order."'1 62 Despite the harsh
results of the categorical Garcetti rule, the D.C. Circuit insisted that an
employee asserting First Amendment claims must seek protection
elsewhere. 163
153. See id. at 46-47.
154. Id. at 47.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 47-48.
157. Id. (quoting Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 241 (2d Cir. 2011)).
158. See Jackler, 658 F.3d at 231-32; Bowie, 653 F.3d at 48.
159. Bowie, 653 F.3d at 48.
160. Id.
161. See Jackler, 658 F.3d at 231-32.
162. Bowie, 653 F.3d at 48.
163. Id. (suggesting whistleblowers might seek protection under whistleblower
statutes).
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IV. ANALYSIS: THE "OFFICIAL DUTY" OF
WHISTLEBLOWERS
Bowie and Jackler cannot be read in harmony. Both employees filed
statements with their employers, both resisted pressure to change their
statements, and both claimed this caused their dismissal.164 Thus, the
D.C. and Second Circuits propose conflicting methods of analyzing the
First Amendment rights of government employees. 165 This Part attempts
to answer two critical questions raised when a government employee is
disciplined for filing a report, memo, affidavit, or any similar statement
and refusing to retract it. First, what is the test for determining whether
speech is pursuant to an employee's official duties, and thus unprotected
by the First Amendment under Garcetti? As the D.C. Circuit correctly
suggested, the Second Circuit's civilian analog test is impossibly broad
and cannot be applied without gutting Garcetti.166 Rather, courts should
focus on what an employee was paid to perform to determine his official
duties. Second, what duties arise when a whistleblower writes a report
and refuses to retract it? Analyzing two distinct duties, a duty to tell the
truth and another duty not to lie, unnecessarily distorts the Garcetti
framework. Instead, public employees have only a duty to tell the truth.
A. A TEST TO DETERMINE "OFFICIAL DUTIES"
1. The Civilian Analog Test is an Unworkable Alternative
The Second Circuit's civilian analog test transforms the Garcetti official
duties question into an exercise in creativity. Analyzing a government
employee's First Amendment rights should stop once a court determines
his speech was made pursuant to official duties.' 67 Instead, the civilian
analog test draws increasingly strained comparisons to civilian speech in
hopes of transforming official speech into civilian speech. The Second
Circuit found Jackler's speech protected because it was analogous to a
civilian who files a police report and refuses to retract it.16 8 But Jackler is
not like a civilian who files a police report, he is the police. Construing
Jackler as an innocent bystander who appeared at the police station to
report misconduct muddles the Garcetti question of official duties. The
question asks whether an employee spoke pursuant to his official govern-
ment duties, not whether a civilian could conceivably engage in similar
conduct. 169 Viewing speech through the warped lens of civilian analogs
dilutes the Garcetti Court's categorical rule.
164. See Jackler, 658 F.3d at 230-32; Bowie, 653 F.3d at 46.
165. Compare Jackler, 658 F.3d at 231-34, with Bowie, 653 F.3d at 45-48.
166. Bowie, 653 F.3d at 48.
167. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (stating the categorical rule that
"[w]e reject, however, the notion that the First Amendment shields from discipline the
expressions employees make pursuant to their professional duties").
168. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241.
169. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.
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The Court never intended for civilian analogs to be dispositive. Justice
Kennedy wrote, "When a public employee speaks pursuant to employ-
ment responsibilities ... there is no relevant analogue to speech by citi-
zens who are not government employees."' 170 The existence of an
irrelevant and distant comparison to civilian speech scarcely suggests offi-
cial speech is no longer official. As Justice Kennedy explained, official
speech is more thoroughly regulated because the government created it.
The Court emphasized two sentences earlier that "[e]mployees who make
public statements outside the course of performing their official duties
retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the
kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the govern-
ment. '171 Thus, only when employees speak outside their official duties
is the civilian comparison relevant. However, similarity to civilian speech
should not affect, much less determine, the "pursuant to official duties"
calculus. The Second Circuit had no choice but to glean guidance from
Justice Kennedy's dictum because the Garcetti Court declined to create a
"comprehensive framework. '172 However, a test that eviscerates the
Court's controlling factor by comparing official speech to vaguely similar
civilian speech is infeasible.
In addition to conflicting with the D.C. Circuit, the Jackler court con-
flicts with the Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit in the context of an em-
ployee refusing to lie.173 In Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, the Ninth Circuit
found that two police officers spoke pursuant to their official duties when
they submitted a memo detailing police corruption and suffered employer
retaliation.174 The officers argued that they were acting beyond their po-
lice duties when they resisted pressure from their superiors to stop inves-
tigating.175 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit found that the memo was part
of their official duties because they were ordered to prepare it and be-
cause officers have a duty to report crimes. 176 In Barachkov v. 41B Dis-
trict Court, the Sixth Circuit found that Garcetti barred the First
Amendment action of two court clerks who argued that they were fired
for "failing to provide false information" in a management oversight re-
view.1 77 The Sixth Circuit did not use a civilian analog test nor did it
reference a distinct duty to refuse to lie.178 Rather, it found Garcetti con-
trolled because the interviews were "at the behest of their employer and
as part of their professional responsibilities. '179 It is difficult to gauge
whether Barachkov and Huppert indicate a wider circuit split because
170. Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 423.
172. Id. at 424-25.
173. See Barachkov v. 41B Dist. Court, 311 F. App'x 863 (6th Cir. 2009); Huppert v.
City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2009).
174. 574 F.3d at 706-07.
175. Id. at 703.
176. Id. at 706-07.
177. 311 F. App'x at 866.
178. See id. at 863.
179. Id. at 870.
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both analyzed the Garcetti question much less thoroughly than Bowie and
Jackler. The Sixth Circuit analyzed the question on different grounds en-
tirely, considering "ad hoc dut[ies] which fall[] within the scope of an
employee's official responsibilities despite not appearing in any written
job description.' 80 Neither Bowie nor Jackler cite to Barachkov, despite
the similarity of their facts, possibly because Barachkov is an unpublished
opinion and the Sixth Circuit sidestepped the civilian analog question.181
At least regarding their holdings, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits reached
the opposite conclusion from the Second Circuit on very similar facts,
suggesting the civilian analog test yields anomalous results.
Jackler further conflicts with the Second Circuit's own application of
the civilian analog test in Weintraub.182 The court found no civilian ana-
log to Weintraub's union grievance because it was "part-and-parcel of his
concerns about his ability to properly execute his duties" and therefore
"pursuant to his official duties. ' 183 However, a government union griev-
ance is readily analogous to a civilian union grievance. Any union worker
is allowed to communicate with his union regardless of his specific em-
ployer. The comparison in Weintraub is as strong, if not stronger, than in
Jackler where the court found a civilian analog. Unlike a civilian, Jackler
was required by police regulations to relate what he saw in his report. 18
A civilian could not create this type of report because the regulation ap-
plied only to "officers present" when force was used rather than people
present.18 5 Thus, any civilian analog between Jackler's report and a civil-
ian's is more tenuous than the analog between a government and civilian
union grievance.1 86
Judge Calabresi's dissent in Weintraub echoed this criticism when he
argued that Justice Kennedy's reference to analogs does not create "a
doctrinal requirement. Rather, the Supreme Court was expounding upon
'the theoretical underpinnings of [its] decisions.' That is, it was explaining
why speech that is 'pursuant to employment responsibilities,' is unpro-
tected, not defining that category of speech."18 7 The Court's civilian ana-
log rationale should not be inflated into a doctrinal requirement.
Any court that adopts the civilian analog test risks a wholesale renunci-
ation of Garcetti. Construed broadly enough, apples are analogous to or-
anges. The Garcetti Court's categorical rule becomes an exercise in
creativity for clever plaintiffs. Jackler's police report was not official be-
180. Id.
181. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10-11, Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir.
2011) (No. 11-517). The government's attorneys cite to Barachkov as potentially creating
an even broader circuit split. Id.
182. See Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2010).
183. Id. at 203 (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241. A union grievance by a civilian employee seems readily
analogous to a teacher's union grievance. Id. As discussed later, whether there is a civilian
analog is always a matter of how hard the particular court is willing to look. Id.
185. Id. at 231.
186. Id. (citing Middletown Police Order 03-01, at 3-4).
187. Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 206 (internal citations omitted).
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cause it was like a civilian report. Bowie might argue his affidavit was
just like the ones that civilians routinely submit in court proceedings. 188
Even Garcetti would turn out differently if the Supreme Court compared
Ceballos's disposition memo to a civilian attorney's work product.18 9 The
test is inescapably arbitrary because each court chooses how far to cast its
net in each case. The Jackler court propounded on many civilian compar-
isons to a police report, while the Weintraub court summarily found there
was no civilian analog to a union grievance. 190 Drawing civilian compari-
sons always relies on looking beyond the record to consider the full range
of civilian speech. The First Amendment rights of government workers
should not change depending on each plaintiff's ability to draw strained
civilian comparisons.
Fundamentally, the civilian analog is a tacit appeal for parity where
none is warranted under the Supreme Court's rationale in Garcetti. The
Jackler court's reasoning relies on the perceived unfairness of treating
government employees differently from their civilian counterparts. 191
The civilian analog bridges this gap by treating Officer Jackler as private
citizen Jackler. But the central purpose of Garcetti was to create a dis-
tinction between the First Amendment rights of government employees
and civilians. 192 The Jackler court finds ample policy support in the
volumes of scholarship that are harshly critical of the Court's holding, but
an appeal to turn back the clock before Garcetti is legally unsound.1 93
The Pickering Court already defined the circumstances in which a gov-
ernment employee speaks as a civilian citizen. But when a worker speaks
pursuant to his official duties, as Jackler plainly did in his police report,
Garcetti leaves no accommodation for equality. The First Amendment
rights of government employees are unequivocally unequal. Efforts to
the contrary find no support in Garcetti.
188. Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1134, reh'g denied, 653 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
In fact, Bowie would be the most likely to escape Garcetti under a civilian analog test.
Unlike Jackler's police report or Ceballos's memo, Bowie's affidavit was part of OIG's
procedural response to being sued. Id. Any private employer accused of discrimination
would similarly muster supporting employee statements.
189. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422-24 (2006).
190. Compare Jackler, 658 F.3d at 238-40, with Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 201.
191. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 239.
192. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 436 ("[A]ny statement made within the scope of public em-
ployment is (or should be treated as) the government's own speech... and should thus be
differentiated as a matter of law from the personal statements the First Amendment
protects.").
193. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti's Impact on the First Amendment Speech
Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 117-19 (2008) ("[T]he Court
has now made it nearly impossible for conscientious public servants to speak out in the
best interests of the public without jeopardizing their careers. Yet, if possible, the situation
is even worse for federal employees. .. . [F]ederal employees will have to just tolerate the
evisceration of their constitutional rights and stay silent at work. Collectively as citizens,
we are all the poorer for tolerating this undemocratic state of affairs.").
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2. "Paid to Perform" is Preferable to "Civilian Analog"
If not the civilian analog test, courts and attorneys need guidance to
analyze official duties. The Court invited such speculation when it de-
clined to create a "comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an
employee's duties in cases where there is room for serious debate."'1 94
Commentators have no choice but to sift through Justice Kennedy's dic-
tum for clarity, as the Second Circuit did. However, the Court's paid to
perform rationale is a more workable framework for determining official
duties than the civilian analog test. Justice Kennedy explained, "When he
went to work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos
acted as a government employee. ' 195 Ceballos acted as an official rather
than a citizen because writing memos was "part of what he was employed
to do."'196 Thus, an employee speaks pursuant to his official duties when
he delivers what his employer bought and paid for.197 Ceballos was paid
as a prosecutor to review cases and prepare disposition memos.198 Bowie
was paid to supervise his subordinates and submit affidavits if lawsuits
arose. 199 Jackler was paid to patrol and to write reports when regulations
required.200 Garcetti is more palatable when phrased in terms of the em-
ployer keeping what it created rather than quashing an analogous civilian
right. The Court bolstered this reading when it explained, "Restricting
speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional respon-
sibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed
as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control
over what the employer itself has commissioned or created."'201
A workable test would consider whether the speech was part of what
the employee was paid to do, regardless of civilian analogs. If the answer
is yes, Garcetti bars any First Amendment claims, notwithstanding a civil-
ian analog. If the answer is no, the employee is entitled to Pickering bal-
ancing. For simplicity, this Comment refers to the analysis as a paid to
perform test. Admittedly, a test that asks what an employee was paid to
perform or employed to do largely echoes the question it attempts to
answer: Did the employee speak pursuant to his official duties? But sim-
plicity yields greater clarity than the amorphous civilian analog. Cru-
cially, a paid to perform test determines an employee's free speech
194. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
195. Id. at 422. Justice Souter's dissent echoed a similar inquiry, considering whether
Ceballos "was hired to perform such a speaking assignment," whether "[hie was paid to
enforce the law," or whether he "was not paid to advance one specific policy." Id. at 437
(Souter, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 411 (majority opinion).
197. See, e.g., Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom, Reconciling the Public Employee Speech
Doctrine and Academic Speech After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1202, 1226
(2010) ("In Garcetti, the Court explained that public employee speech is government
speech because the government paid for the speech and the government selected what
message to deliver.").
198. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 411.
199. Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
200. Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 230 (2d Cir. 2011).
201. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 411.
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parameters when he and the employer reach an initial hiring agreement.
The employee's official duties encompass the tasks that the employer
hired him to perform. In contrast, the civilian analog is determined in
litigation whenever a particular court opines about apparent civilian com-
parisons. A simpler paid to perform test offers greater clarity where
much is needed.
Asking what the employee was paid to perform spares courts from
straining to find civilian comparisons. Gleaning a civilian analog required
the Second Circuit to cull principles from evidence law, state statutes, the
federal code, and case law. The court analogized Jackler's report to the
civilian right to give evidence in an investigation and cited various stat-
utes that forbid false testimony.202 The Second Circuit cited its own rea-
soning in Weintraub to note that "any citizen in a democratic society
regardless of his status as a public employee," has the right to report "to
an independent state agency. '20 3 Because the civilian victim of brutality
in Jackler filed a complaint first, Jackler had a similar civilian right to
refuse to retract his report. However, as discussed above, it is illogical to
analogize an officer as reporting to an independent agency when he re-
ports conduct to his own superiors. The civilian analog test determines
what employee speech is like, while paid to perform discerns what it is.
Without calling the test by name, other courts have focused on what an
employee was paid to perform to determine his official duties. For in-
stance, the Ninth Circuit used a paid to perform inquiry like a Garcetti
mad lib: "When [they] went to work and performed the tasks [they were]
paid to perform, [Huppert and Salgado] acted as .. .government em-
ployee[s]. The fact that [their] duties sometimes required [them] to speak
or write does not mean [their] supervisors were prohibited from evaluat-
ing [their] performance. 20 4 Construed from the paid to perform per-
spective, the case became "one of the clearest examples of speech
pursuant to one's job duties. ' 20 5 When the ultimate objective is to deter-
mine whether speech is made pursuant to an employee's official duties, it
is natural to begin by focusing on the employee's work functions.
A paid to perform test makes the analysis in Jackler infinitely simpler.
Surely Jackler was employed to routinely file police reports about his ac-
tivities. In the most basic sense, an officer is employed to perform his
duties and record what he does. Jackler's entire suit flowed from the re-
port he wrote about the abuse he witnessed.20 6 Because Jackler was em-
ployed and paid to prepare reports, the speech was made pursuant to his
202. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 239.
203. Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 204 (2d Cir. 2010).
204. Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 706 (9th Cir. 2009) (alterations in origi-
nal) (functionally employing a paid to perform test although the Ninth Circuit does not
explicitly characterize it as such or explain its reasoning in detail).
205. Id. at 706 (finding paid to perform indicative, but not necessarily dispositive: "Ad-
ditionally, if the public employee was paid for the speech-e.g., drafting a memorandum,
creating a report, advising a supervisor-then that compensation might be indicative of the
nature of the speech.").
206. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 230-31.
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official duties, and his First Amendment claims are barred by Garcetti.
Unlike many so-called whistleblowers, there is no indication that Jackler
was acting out of any personal initiative. Rather, he obeyed the depart-
ment regulation that required a supplementary report when an officer
used force.207 It is difficult to imagine a clearer case of a government
employer getting what it expected and paid for. The report owes its exis-
tence more to the cause and effect of police department regulations than
to altruistic whistleblowing. Jackler argued that he stood by his report
when his superiors pressured him to change it, but as discussed thor-
oughly below, refusing to lie is part-and-parcel of promising to tell the
truth.208 Yet the porous civilian analog test allowed Jackler's report to
escape the Garcetti umbrella by drawing civilian comparisons from a myr-
iad of authorities. Asking what the department employed and paid
Jackler to do yields the straightforward and correct answer that his report
was made pursuant to his official duties.
The greatest pitfall of paid to perform has already been addressed by
the Court. Critics warn that a government employer could craft artifi-
cially broad job descriptions, and thus expand the scope of an employee's
official duties to regulate even private speech.209 For instance, an im-
proper employment agreement might state: "An employee will speak
truthfully about all matters relating to his employment. '210 At first
glance, the paid to perform test would unfairly punish even off-the-job
speech while the civilian analog would offer protection. But the Court
quashed such efforts before they began by emphatically rejecting "the
suggestion that employers can restrict employees' rights by creating ex-
cessively broad job descriptions."'211 The paid to perform inquiry is
"practical" because "[f]ormal job descriptions often bear little resem-
blance to the duties an employee actually is expected to perform." 212
Thus, the Court's practical approach leaves enough leeway to apply the
paid to perform test without resorting to the vagueness of civilian ana-
logs. Any inquiry would consider which duties an employee was actually
expected to perform on a routine basis, regardless of formal job
descriptions.
B. THE DUTIES OF WHISTLEBLOWERS UNDER "PAID TO PERFORM"
Any test to determine whether duties are official is useless if courts
cannot agree on which duties to analyze. Disagreement exists over
whether government whistleblowers have an official duty to tell the truth
207. Id. at 231 (quoting Middletown Police Department regulations: "An offense report
will be completed by the officer who initially used physical force and a supplementary
report will be completed by all other officers present whether they used physical force or
not." (emphasis omitted)).
208. Id. at 230-31; see infra Part IV.B.
209. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424-25 (2006).
210. See id. at 411 (violating the Court's warning that subject matter is not dispositive).
211. Id. at 424.
212. Id. at 424-25.
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and a civilian duty to refuse to lie.213 Undeniably, an employee has a
duty to tell the truth on the job. The Jackler court recognized that "[o]f
course a police officer has a duty not to substitute a falsehood for the
truth, i.e., a duty to tell 'nothing but the truth." 214 Likewise, Bowie was
required to submit a truthful affidavit. But the Second Circuit went
astray when it distinguished a separate civilian duty to refuse to lie be-
yond the duty to tell the truth, or "the right[ ] of a citizen to refuse to
retract a report to the police that he believes is true, to refuse to make a
statement that he believes is false, and to refuse to engage in unlawful
conduct by filing a false report with the police. ' 215 Thus, "Jackler's re-
fusal to comply with orders to retract his truthful Report and file one that
was false ... was not simply doing his job in refusing to obey those orders
from the department's top administrative officers and the chief of po-
lice. '2 16 In essence, the court construed refusing to lie as a separate civil-
ian duty above and beyond Jackler's official duty to tell the truth.
Construing a separate duty not to lie splits hairs with absurd effects.
The official duty to tell the truth necessarily encompasses the duty not to
lie. A witness does not swear an oath "to tell the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth" and a separate oath not to lie. Refusing to lie
is simply insisting on telling the truth. Any employee could shield himself
from discipline by invoking his civilian right to refuse to lie. Claiming, "I
was fired for telling the truth" becomes "I was fired for refusing to lie."
Most glaringly, Garcetti would have turned out differently under the Sec-
ond Circuit's reasoning. Ceballos would simply sidestep his official duties
to produce disposition memos and instead invoke his civilian right "[to
refuse] to retract his Report and [to refuse to substitute] statements that
were false."'217 In Huppert, the Ninth Circuit was also unwilling to in-
dulge a separate refuse-to-lie duty. The court of appeals denied First
Amendment protection to officers who claimed they were retaliated
against for their investigation and grand jury testimony regarding police
corruption. 218 Because their supervisor "told [the officers] to continue
the investigation and encouraged them to report the results," even
though supervisors later tried to change the results, the court found that it
was "one of the clearest examples of speech pursuant to one's job du-
ties. '' 219 Similarly, Jackler had an official duty to report the truth in his
report.
213. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 240 (2d Cir. 2011); Barachkov v. 41B Dist.
Court, 311 Fed. App'x 863, 866 (6th Cir. 2009) (indicating that the employees argued they
were fired for refusing to lie. Accordingly, the civilian duty to "not lie" is not isolated to
the facts of this particular circuit split. Rather, government employees will likely raise such
an argument whenever disciplined for speech.).
214. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 241-42 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 234. Of course, Bowie would have also reached the opposite result if the
court applied a "refusal to lie" duty.
218. See Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 706 (9th Cir. 2009).
219. Id.
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This is not to say that officials never have a distinct civilian duty to tell
the truth. Justice Souter's dissent recognized the unsettled issue that "the
claim relating to truthful testimony in court must surely be analyzed inde-
pendently to protect the integrity of the judicial process. '220 But even
those who have argued for a separate civilian duty of truthfulness were
speaking only in terms of in-court testimony, apart from an official's rou-
tine duties.221 For instance, the Seventh Circuit found an officer's deposi-
tion in a civil suit regarding police corruption was "a different story"
because "it was not part of what he was employed to do."'222 Similarly,
one commentator suggested that "[a] police officer who gives truthful tes-
timony acts primarily as a citizen even if the substance of his testimony is
fairly characterized as 'ow[ing] its existence' to his employment as a po-
lice officer. '223 Jackler's internal report implicates none of the judicial
integrity concerns raised by in-court testimony. His story might be differ-
ent if he were subpoenaed to testify, but filing a report that he was re-
quired by regulations to prepare was certainly pursuant to Jackler's duties
as an officer.
Rejecting the Second Circuit's permissive construction of Garcetti
causes anomalous and unforgiving policy results. But ironically, such dra-
conian effects are a sure sign that the rule is being applied properly.
Scholarship on Garcetti reads like a parade of policy horribles.224 When
asked whether the First Amendment protects government workers pursu-
ant to their official duties, the Supreme Court answered "never," not
"sometimes." 225 Accordingly, the Jackler court's policy rationales ring
hollow when the Supreme Court's ruling was so blatantly unforgiving. As
the D.C. Circuit suggested, the Jackler court may well have been swayed
by the shocking facts of Jackler's dismissal and apparent cover-up. But, a
plainly categorical rule leaves no latitude for sympathetic circumstances.
On the scale between employee free speech and employer discipline, the
Court chose the latter.226 Creating a separate whistleblower's duty to re-
fuse to lie is unfaithful to Garcetti because it dilutes and contorts the Su-
220. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 444 (2006).
221. See Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Reilly v. City of
Atl. City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying the same principle to officers testifying
in criminal trials: "When a government employee testifies truthfully, s/he is not 'simply
performing his or her job duties,' . . . rather, the employee is acting as a citizen and is
bound by the dictates of the court and the rules of evidence.").
222. Morales, 494 F.3d at 598.
223. Leslie Pope, Huppert v. City of Pittsburg: The Contested Status of Police Officers'
Subpoenaed Testimony After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 119 YALE L.J. 2143, 2149 (2010) (altera-
tion in original); see also Jody L. Rodenberg, Freedom of Speech and the "Catch-22" for
Public Employees in the Ninth Circuit-Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 63 SMU L. REV. 259,
264 (2010) (explaining officers have "a separate duty to testify at trial that exists apart from
any official duties that an officer may have").
224. See, e.g., Public Employee Speech, 120 HARV. L. REV. 273, 280 (2006) (arguing
that Garcetti "creates a perverse incentive" and that "government employees lose protec-
tion when fulfilling job-related duties but retain protection when speaking directly to the
media").




preme Court's holding beyond the category of interpretation it can
reasonably allow.
V. CONCLUSION
Jason Jackler's First Amendment rights vanished long before he wit-
nessed his coworker strike a suspect.227 Had the Second Circuit faithfully
applied Garcetti, Jackler's First Amendment claims would have been de-
nied because they were pursuant to his official duties. Despite the wide
array of unsettled Garcetti applications on issues from academic freedom
to labor laws, this circuit split strikes at the heart of the Garcetti frame-
work: Does the First Amendment protect a government whistleblower
when he prepares a report and refuses to retract it despite employer re-
taliation? While the D.C. and Second Circuits have reached an impasse,
courts that have not yet spoken and practitioners should consider three
principles.
First, the civilian analog test is a fundamentally unworkable framework
for considering Garcetti questions. The test complicates far more than it
clarifies by forcing courts to search speculatively for civilian comparisons
to every conceivable form of official speech. Further, it eviscerates the
Garcetti rule entirely whenever a plaintiff is clever enough to identify a
civilian analog or a court is willing to find one. In contrast, a paid to
perform test is simpler and more effective at correctly determining
whether an employee speaks pursuant to his official duties. Whether a
court applies the paid to perform test proposed in this Comment or an-
other test, the civilian analog invariably leads courts on a wild goose
chase that should be avoided.
Second, parsing employees' duties in unreasonable ways so that a test
might yield a particular result is not a feasible construction of Garcetti. In
Jackler, it resulted in a duty not to lie that was distinct from a duty to tell
the truth.228 But in a broader sense, it muddles the Garcetti analysis and
rejects the Court's admonition to consider duties practically rather than
relying on formal job descriptions.22 9 An endless number of duties can
be gleaned from the everyday tasks of government employees, but a prac-
tical approach is both truer to Garcetti and easier to apply. Courts and
practitioners should consider an employee's routine duties without
resorting to legalistically splitting hairs.
Finally, courts should be wary of public policy appeals bemoaning ine-
quality between public and private employees when that is precisely what
the Court intended. Properly applying Garcetti invariably results in pub-
lic employees being denied First Amendment protection when they speak
in furtherance of their official duties.230 The Court's categorical rule
227. Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 231 (2d Cir. 2011).
228. Id. at 240-42.
229. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25 (majority opinion).
230. Id. at 446 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("In a word, the majority says, 'never.' That
word, in my view, is too absolute.").
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commonly results in well-meaning employees being left without First
Amendment recourse when they lodge internal complaints, even though
the same employee might be protected if they complained externally to
the press. Punishing the employee who reports misconduct to his superi-
ors but protecting the employee who complains to "political smut pur-
veyor[s]" might well "[defy] sound reason," but it is the natural
consequence of correctly applying the Court's holding. Similarly anoma-
lous policy results appeared to motivate the Second Circuit's misreading
of Garcetti.2 31 Empathy is a poor guide for defining the contours of
Garcetti's unforgiving rule. Government employees are different than
their civilian analogs precisely because the employer paid to produce the
speech in question. Jackler is emblematic of efforts to dilute Garcetti
when it cannot be circumvented. 232 But these piecemeal efforts cause
more peril than payoff. The only thing worse than Garcetti is a distortion
of Garcetti that arbitrarily delineates free from restricted speech and
leaves employees uncertain whether they are protected. The test offered
here prizes clarity, better enabling government employees to navigate the
otherwise chaotic shoals of Garcetti.
231. Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("Under the circumstances, it is
not difficult to sympathize with the Second Circuit's dubious interpretation of Garcetti.
The police chief's instruction to Jackler and the actions he ordered Jackler to take were
clearly illegal.").
232. Hudson, supra note 142 ("Garcetti is a dangerous precedent that not only deprives
public employees of valuable speech protections, but also harms the public interest by
creating a strong incentive for public employees to remain silent. Let's hope this decision
by the 2nd Circuit will lead to more Garcetti exceptions until the Supreme Court sees how
ill-advised that decision was.").
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